“Numerous and Insurmountable Obstacles”:

John Henry Aulick on the Far China Station

A History Honors Thesis

By:

Midshipman 1/c Stephen D. Chivers, Class of 2001

Professor Craig L. Symonds, Advisor

U.S. Naval Academy

Annapolis, Maryland

“I should like nothing better then to be down on those fellows chop, chop!”

-Commodore John Henry Aulick, 1852

In February of 1852, Commodore John Henry Aulick arrived in Hong Kong in command of the new paddle-wheel steamer U.S.S. *Susquehanna* after an 18,000-mile cruise from Norfolk that had occupied a full eight months. In addition to taking command of the rather grandly-named two-ship East India Squadron, Aulick was preparing to lead his command to the mysterious island empire of Japan in the hope of opening that country to western trade. It was a mission he had proposed to Secretary of the Navy William A. Graham in 1850 and he now looked forward to its imminent fulfillment. But only a week after his arrival on station, Aulick received new orders from the Secretary of the Navy: he was to stand fast in Hong Kong and await relief as commanding officer.

Surprised, confused, and eventually angered by these unexpected orders, Aulick was further astounded by another set of orders that arrived a week later. These came via the State Department Consul in Canton, and they ordered him to proceed with his squadron to Japan as originally planned. Graham's orders bore a more recent date, but Aulick clung to the hope that he could clear up the confusion surrounding his proposed relief and proceed with his original orders. For more then a year, Aulick fought the orders removing him from command --even as his physical health deteriorated– but in the end the struggle mastered him. In 1853 he surrendered his command and returned to America a beaten man. He achieved a pyrrhic victory of sorts when the Navy officially cleared him of any wrong doing in October. But that same year, Matthew C. Perry won professional acclaim and historic distinction by concluding a treaty with Japan.

Aulick's personal and professional dilemma, as well as his behavior, offers a window into the world of squadron command during the mid-19th century. On the one hand, it illuminates the near sovereignty of a naval squadron commander operating thousands of miles from his own

country in the age before telegraph or radio. As commodore of the East India Squadron, Aulick dealt with various European rivals, foreign dignitaries, merchants from every corner of the globe, Manchu Chinese officials, and kept a weather eye out for Chinese junks (both compliant merchants and bloodthirsty pirates). In addition he received supplications from American diplomats overseas who tended to view him as their personal cop-on-the-beat, as well as from American merchants who expected him to respond to their nearly-continuous calls for protection. But while the American Consul in Canton, a man with the unlikely name of Peter Parker was the putative representative of American authority in the Far East, it was Aulick's squadron that was the living embodiment of American power on the Far China Station.

On the other hand, Aulick was considerably less sovereign within the highly personal and politicized world of the Navy's high command. In a service with 700 officers of all ranks, there was not only an understood set of professional values, there was also a fierce rivalry for command opportunities. This was especially true in a Navy which boasted only 34 ships and six squadron commands, but which had some 68 Captains and 97 Commanders to fill the available positions.[1] As powerful and sovereign as he seemed to local observers in Hong Kong, Aulick would be undone in part by the poisonous rivalry between senior officers of the navy.

A forty-one year veteran of the U.S. Navy, Aulick had almost literally grown up in the service. Having entered the Navy as a Midshipman in 1810 at the age of 20, he accepted the value system of the nineteenth century officer corps which held personal honor in the highest regard. This was a value system in which personal honor was the most valued coin. As historian

---

[1]Charles Oscar Paullin, *History Of Naval Administration*, (Annapolis, M.D.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968), 239. (first published as a collection of articles in U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*)

Charles Oscar Paullin has noted:

> "The sense of personal honor among the officers of the Old Navy was so excessive and extravagant that it was often absurd... On the Mediterranean, Brazil, and Pacific stations our officers often fought with foreigners, and especially with foreign officers. At home they sometimes engaged in bouts with civilians."

As Aulick rose through the ranks, he fought numerous duels, particularly while serving as a young Lieutenant on the Mediterranean station in the 1820's. This was a decade in which "dueling was quite common," especially among junior officers. As Paullin has noted, "more duels were fought during these years than during all the others of the Navy's history." The value of personal honor was thus embedded in young Aulick during his formative years, and throughout the duration of his time on station in China it would prove his primary concern when dealing with higher authority.[2]

Aulick also knew that the internal politics of the Navy Department were in complete disarray. Naval Secretary after Secretary were appointed by Whig and Democratic presidents from 1812 to 1852 solely to implement administration policies for expansion or retrenchment of the U.S. Navy. The Navy Department was too small and understaffed –the department's entire staff numbered only 30 men in the 1840's– to seriously examine the needs of the nation in terms of Naval policy. Because of this, "The navy was more or less run by cliques...the inferior officers accused their superiors of applying or withholding the laws of the navy according to the dictates

---

[2]Ibid, 193.

of convenience and prejudice." In a Navy divided against itself, it was these cliques that largely determined which officers appeared on the Secretaries' preferred list for command, and which were quietly deposited in shore commands and bureaus. Aulick knew that many of the younger officers in his own squadron looked upon him with contempt and believed that he was too old to exercise effective command, indeed, that officers of his age and rank impeded the flow of promotions. The quarter-deck, many young officers fondly pointed out, was not the place for the "lean and slippered pantaloon" of old age.[3]

Such views also hindered the Navy's ability to deal effectively with a Congress that grew increasingly interventionist throughout Aulick's career. In the early 1840's, Congress led a charge to discontinue the daily ration of alcohol aboard Naval vessels. Despite opposition from many in the Navy, in 1842 Congress reduced the alcohol rations for officers and seamen alike to only one-fourth of a pint. Another social revolution occurred in 1850 when Congress banned flogging in the Navy. Despite a fierce campaign of opposition from officers, administrators, and enlisted men alike –all of whom felt flogging to be a manly punishment from which a true seafaring man should not shrink– the House and Senate passed bills banning flogging in the Navy. For officers the effects were a devastating loss of discipline afloat and "numerous complaints reached the Navy Department of insubordination and serious irregularities among the seamen... The number of desertions increased, and many good seamen refused to enlist."[4] This occurred just as Aulick was preparing to begin his cruise to the Far East, and in his view the ill-effects were made worse by the fact that Congress had not thought to implement other punishments in place of flogging.

---

[3]Ibid, 174-175, 191, 234.

[4]Ibid, 233-234.

The Navy had also changed in terms of its diplomatic role. When Aulick took command of the East India Squadron he was 62 years old. He had cut his teeth in a Navy that had known only sails and functioned mostly in single-ship operations. During his career, he had fought in two wars (1812 and Mexican), negotiated several treaties and diplomatic agreements, commanded numerous vessels ranging from schooners to frigates, spent nearly 24 years at sea, and endured many other tumultuous experiences. As his career progressed he saw the steady rise in involvement and prestige of the United States in world affairs.

At the start of his career, despite some limited success against the Barbary states in the early part of the century, America had not attempted to project power overseas. National policy goals abroad consisted of promoting international commerce and defending established trading relationships. Yet by the 1850's, in the wake of the successful war against Mexico, America was already beginning to seek a more prominent role for itself in the international arena. After witnessing the success of the British and French in establishing favorable trade relations with China, the U.S. sought to expand its own export markets in Asia as well. Lacking the colonial assets or force of arms of the European powers, America relied on diplomacy to do this.[5]

American Naval officers were frequently used for diplomatic negotiations. In many respects, Naval officers represented America's principle diplomatic tool in the nineteenth century. Unlike their foreign service counterparts, U.S. Navy Commodores moved from nation to nation on a monthly or even weekly basis. This mobility required them to continually adapt themselves to new environments and cultures as they encountered them. Their training as mariners reinforced in them the ideals of reciprocity between host and guest, and the importance of maintaining an

---

[5]Thomas Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy*. (New York: Meredith Publishing, 1968), 71-76.

even keel in the balance of power in a region. In the nineteenth century, it was therefore common practice for the Executive Branch to entrust delicate negotiations to naval officers abroad.[6]

Prior to the widespread introduction of steam and the telegraph, these Commodores formed the backbone of American overseas presence. They had the firepower and mobility needed to deal with regional crises, and they knew it. Even their very title – Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces– lent them an air of legitimacy that State Department Consuls could only dream of. The notion of being a law unto themselves was the rule rather then the exception. As Commodore David Porter once noted a Commodore on station was,"the little tyrant who struts his few fathoms of scoured plank; a solitary being in the midst of the ocean."[7] Old Naval Commodores had their own notions of dignity and proper conduct between superiors and subordinates. It was not uncommon for Commodore's to associate with officers through formal correspondence only, despite being present aboard the same vessel.

The case of Commodore John Henry Aulick however exposes some of the practical limits on a Commodore's authority and illuminates the changing nature of naval command and American diplomacy in the 1850's. By the middle of the nineteenth century it was not nearly enough that an officer should be "a capable mariner...gentlemen of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor." Naval leaders needed to be politically adept, connected, and opportunistic in their approaches to senior officials. The squadron commander's duties had grown to such an extent that it was not enough for him to be an accomplished military leader or diplomat abroad. In the new rubric, success required a high

---

[6]Ibid, 248.

[7]Paullin, 191.

level of technological competence and political shrewdness to overcome the fierce rivalries within the Navy Department. An officer without strong advocates in Washington could find himself quickly in disfavor and so far removed from the communications loop as to become expendable.

When Aulick took command of the East India Squadron in April of 1851, it had but one vessel: the newly commissioned *U.S.S. Susquehanna*. This frigate was to usher in the era of dual steam and sail propulsion for the U.S. Navy in global operations. Her sails were equal to that of a *Constitution*-class vessel, but her boilers were designed to enhance her mobility in ship-to-ship combat. Her great length (some 257 feet) and displacement (nearly 2500 tons) were intended to make her ideal for long voyages. Yet there were severe limitations to the vessel. Despite her advanced design, the side-wheeled steamer could only make 3,500 miles on a full load of coal. In addition, no one had thought to design a better way to coal the ship then simply having the sailors hoist individual bags over the side and into the bunkers. It took some 10 days of heavy labor by the ship's compliment to coal some 380 tons into the ship. In Aulick's opinion *Susquehanna* was the wrong vessel with which to travel to east Asia; nearly half a world away from the nearest American port or secure coal supply.[8]

Yet the problems with the *Susquehanna* also extended below-deck into the steam propulsion plant. The organization and construction of the steam frigate's engineering spaces were flawed. The boilers and engines were remarkably inefficient, her paddle-wheels were ill-

[8]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, September 27, 1851, U.S. Navy Department, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of the East India Squadron, 1841-1861. Reel 7. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives, Record Group 45, Washington D.C. Hereafter cited as: Commanding Officer's Letters.

constructed, and her draft too slight to allow the paddles the chance to remain submerged in heavy seas. Despite being some 30 feet of diameter, only six feet of the paddle-wheel ever reached the water! As early as June, *Susquehanna*'s chief engineer was writing the department of the Navy complaining of ill-fitting pipes, leaky boilers, and poor condensers.[9] Soon after the ship got underway with full steam, it was discovered that the boilers had been bolted together improperly and leaked steam directly into the engine compartment whenever the ship was cruising at high speeds (9 knots). Worse, the Susquehanna's main steam line was laid directly below her mainmast. Although the steady speed of nine knots through the water made *Susquehanna* faster then the average frigate, the time required to coal the ship easily negated the gain in speed.[10]

Aulick's flagship was also in very poor shape in terms of personnel. Her large size meant that *Susquehanna* possessed not only a complex engine configuration, but also the sails of a full-size frigate. Yet Aulick was rather disturbed to learn that the ship's crew was short some 50 seamen and petty officers. A comparable frigate of the day would have had a full compliment of 430 sailors and 50 Marines. Yet *Susquehanna* had only 270 men and 40 marines.[11] Even when *Susquehanna* eventually received the requested additional petty officers, the sail-handling

---

[9]Chief Engineer Archbold to Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs, June 8, 1851, Commodore John Henry Aulick Papers, 1810-1874. Box 5, Vol. 17. United States Naval Academy Special Collection, Record Group 336, Annapolis, M.D. Hereafter cited as: Aulick Papers.

[10]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, August 2, 1851. Commanding Officers Letters, Reel 6. National Archives.

[11]Captain Inman to Navy Department, January 23, 1851. Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Captains, 1805-1861. Reel 347 Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives, Record Group 45, Washington D.C.. Hereafter cited as: Captain's Letters.

department of the ship was only half the size of that found on a sail frigate. Yet the most serious problems with the steamer would reveal themselves upon the seas.

En route to Rio de Janeiro, the *Susquehanna* encountered rough weather. Within a few days the topmasts began to show signs of giving way. Eventually the foremast and mainmast sprang free of their footings within the ship, due to the tremendous strain placed on the inferior materials anchoring them below deck. Problems with the ship's engines and boilers continued as well, with the added difficulty that the high seas in the South Atlantic often prevented the paddle-wheels from remaining submerged.[12] By the time the ship reached Rio de Janeiro, Aulick found himself thousands of miles from U.S. territory in command of a technological monstrosity which could not reliably go to sea without serious repairs. In fact, Aulick's counterpart in command of the Brazil Squadron --Commodore McKeever– commented, "she [*Susquehanna*] is a total failure...I would not think of attempting to proceed around the Cape of Good Hope in her."[13] McKeever's suggested that Aulick send *Susquehanna* home and await the sloop *U.S.S. Plymouth* to convey him to Hong Kong.

Instead through the good graces of the Brazilian government the dry dock in Rio de Janeiro agreed to repair the ship. Unfortunately the best estimates put the time required for the needed changes at six weeks. Aulick decided that the delay would have to be endured because the *Susquehanna* could not put to sea again safely in her disgraceful state. Yet as one of Aulick's problems was nearing resolution, another became untenable.

---

[12]Chief Engineer Archbold to Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs, September 27, 1851. Aulick Papers, Box 5, Vol. 17, United States Naval Academy.

[13]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, September 22, 1851. Aulick Papers, Box 5, Vol. 17, United States Naval Academy.

It was during the stopover in Rio that Aulick's relationship with *Susquehanna's* commanding officer collapsed. By virtue of his posting as squadron commander, Aulick bore the rank of Commodore. The relationship of a squadron's flag officer with ship's commanding officers was somewhat ill-defined in the mid-nineteenth century. Conflict often arose because the ship's commanding officer was responsible for the vessel and personnel under his command, as well as daily operations, while the Commodore was responsible for the execution of the mission and the overall welfare of the squadron. Yet if the two officers refused to uphold their ends of the arrangement, little could be accomplished.

The commanding officer of the steamer *Susquehanna* was Captain William Inman. A veteran of nearly 30 years naval service, Inman was many years Aulick's junior. He apparently resented the fact that Aulick's son Wily –himself a Midshipman-- was on board. But in addition, Inman found many other things to complain about. He wrote numerous letters to the Navy Department seeking lists of orders and manuals governing the duties of squadron commanders aboard embarked vessels. He felt it was his duty to inform the Department that Aulick had twice countermanded his orders in front of junior officers, thus severely hampering his command authority.[14] Inman also complained that Aulick had ordered him to appoint one of the coxswains as a musician, for the purposes of completing the ship's musical compliment. He therefore wrote a letter to "ask the department whether the ratings of the crew proper of this vessel are entrusted to my direction or to the order of the Commander-in-Chief [Aulick]."[15]

---

[14]Captain Inman to Secretary Graham, July 22, 1851. Captain's Letters, Reel 348, National Archives.

[15]Captain Inman to Secretary Graham, August 8, 1851, Captain's Letters, Reel 348, National Archives.

Two incidents in particular convinced Aulick that he could not trust Inman to execute his duties. The first was Inman's refusal to allow his own clerk –Mr. Heyvel-- to assist Wily in the execution of his duties. Inman reported to Aulick that if his son was to be embarked aboard in the assigned billet of Commodore's clerk he ought to be able to adequately perform the task without help. This response infuriated Aulick, who sent Inman a heated letter in which he reminded his flag captain in no uncertain terms that the Commodore could give orders to any person under his command. Aulick also noted that Inman had several persons on board listed as 'supernumerary' whom he had not yet seen fit to train for proper billeting, which was all Aulick wanted for his son.[16]

The straw that broke the camel's back was not long in coming. In late September Aulick began to audit the ship's ledger, when he noted that a sum of $1,300 was missing from the accounts. Upon further investigation he discovered that Inman had distributed those funds to eighteen members of the ship's company who "were either in debt or had nothing due them at the time." Regulations specified that ship's funds could not be distributed in advance to crew members or officers. Given their strained relationship, Aulick decided he would not look the other way on such an impropriety. He wrote to Inman that he was relieved as the *Susquehanna*'s commanding officer and ordered him to return to the United States. The Squadron sailed from Rio de Janeiro on September 27, 1851 without her flag Captain.[17]

---

[16]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, September 21, 1851, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[17]Ibid.

After departing Rio for the Cape of Good Hope, *Susquehanna* was battered mercilessly by the elements. Aulick reported that due to the lateness of the season and the extreme southern latitude, the ship was hit with "seas higher then any I have ever known before- causing the ship to roll and plunge to such a degree that frequently one wheel was eight or ten feet entirely clear of the water."[18] Yet thanks to the quality of the refit in Rio, no major damage ensued to the ship or her company. *Susquehanna* reached the Cape, where she took on more coal and Aulick was able to gather more news about ports ahead of him from passing ships.

Aulick's first diplomatic encounter was with the Caliphate of Zanzibar. He had been charged in his original orders to deliver a letter to the Sultan from President Fillmore and attempt to restore good relations. In many ways, Aulick's stopover in Zanzibar would be a dress rehearsal for his forthcoming mission to Japan. From the *U.S.S. Dale* Aulick learned that the political circumstances in Zanzibar were precarious. He wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that he was concerned his mission could not succeed because, "the chief of authority there is deemed untrustworthy."[19] When coaling was completed at the Cape, *Susquehanna* departed with best possible speed to reach Zanzibar before the situation deteriorated further.

While approaching Zanzibar up the east coast of Africa, Aulick received more news from a passing southbound mail packet that the Sultan of Zanzibar had not yet returned from a visit to Muscat. Although Aulick's orders specifically directed him to deliver a letter from President Fillmore to the Sultan himself, the Commodore decided that to delay his visit on a mere

---

[18]Commodore Aulick to Secretary of the Navy Graham, October 17, 1851, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 7, National Archives.

[19]Ibid.

technicality would put American interests at risk in the region. The Commodore was facing a culture historically closed to the west without longstanding diplomatic relations with the United States, and he had no accurate firsthand information on which to base an initial opinion.

When the *Susquehanna* arrived off the coast of Zanzibar on December 5, 1851, there was no formal recognition of her arrival: no salute, and no greeting party. Aulick learned that the American Consul had departed the station. Charge d' Affairs Ward had become so disgusted with the refusal of the local leadership to properly render honors to the American flag, that he had filed a letter of protest and returned to the United States. The Commodore immediately realized that this situation was changed dramatically and that his original orders had been overtaken by events. He drafted a letter to three American merchants ashore asking for their aid to determine the exact diplomatic conditions there.

In their reply, the merchants informed Aulick that the U.S. Consul had returned to the United States over a dispute with the Sultan's eldest son –Crown Prince Kahlid– over when the colors of each nation should be saluted and when they should be hauled down. The merchants claimed "the sultan to be incapable of offering an intentional insult to our Country or flag...we have never been molested in any way and in all our personal intercourse with him, he is always kind and affable and we have ready access to him."[20] Although Aulick did not have any knowledge of the treaty obligations or agreements between the United States and Zanzibar (he would not obtain them until reaching Hong Kong in mid-February 1852), he decided the

[20]American Merchants Association of Zanzibar to Commodore Aulick, December 5, 1851, Aulick Papers, Box 5, Vol. 17, United States Naval Academy.

uncertainty of the situation required immediate intervention on his part.[21] Yet faced with conflicting reports of the conduct and intentions of officials ashore, Aulick decided that his only viable course of action was to land and determine them himself.

Aulick therefore wrote a letter to the Prince of Zanzibar asking for a meeting aboard the *Susquehanna* for an exchange of formal diplomatic letters and courtesies. The Prince agreed, and when the two finally met on December 6, 1851, they established an immediate personal relationship. From the outset, Aulick instructed his officers and crew to be extremely attentive to all diplomatic courtesies and honors to be rendered. The size and smartness of the *Susquehanna* was not lost upon Prince Kahlid and he soon extended Aulick a gracious invitation to his personal palace in the hopes of "restoring friendly ties between our two great nations."[22]

Ashore, Prince Kahlid extended full honors to Aulick and offered him the gift of a fine Arabian stallion. The Commodore politely refused the horse, but did accept the fresh fruits and vegetables the Prince offered for his crew. After several hours of tours and visits, Aulick broached the subject of restoring diplomatic ties between the United States and Zanzibar. Kahlid told Aulick that the former Consul to Zanzibar had not been a very diplomatic person. He had insisted that the American colors be saluted by gunfire every morning they were raised, and he had refused to discuss any issue until that one was resolved.[23] Eventually Kahlid's father had grown weary of these demands. Aulick explained to Kahlid that salutes and honors of the colors

---

[21]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, February 20, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 7, National Archives.

[22]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, December 8, 1851, Ibid.

[23]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, December 11, 1851, Ibid.

is standard procedure among nations, but that daily cannon salutes were not necessary.

Determined to restore good relations, Aulick proposed a formal exchange of national honors the next morning when colors were raised aboard the *Susquehanna*. The American flag would be raised first, followed immediately by Zanzibar's. The fort ashore and *Susquehanna* would exchange cannon salutes in alternate volleys until 21 guns had been fired by each side. The two men further agreed that on national days of celebration –July 4th for the Americans– each nation would fire a full salute to honor the other. In terms of naval honors, it was decided that Zanzibar would salute first upon sighting an American warship offshore, and the American warship would return the salute and await a visiting official from Zanzibar before taking any further action. In all these decisions, Aulick played the role of chief negotiator as well as squadron commander. Aulick also appointed the senior American merchant, John F. Wells, as consul pro-tempore, for the purpose of establishing a diplomatic base in the capital. On the morning of December 7th, 1851 the salutes were exchanged without incident, and the American Consulate established ashore.[24]

When some months later, Secretary of State Daniel Webster learned of these negotiations, he wrote to praise Aulick for a job well done. Webster was directed by the President to inform him "of his entire approval of the firm and judicious manner in which you have discharged the delicate and important trusts confided in your care."[25] Aulick's experience and diplomatic ability enabled him to smooth over a very rough situation and derive a positive result on behalf of his

---

[24]Ibid.

[25]Secretary Webster to Commodore Aulick, April 9, 1852. Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18. United States Naval Academy.

nation. In this instance Aulick successfully fulfilled his dual role as ambassador and military liaison. By virtue of his rank and authority, he had appointed an American Consul ashore and provided him with a small cannon and equipment for the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission in Zanzibar.

During the *Susquehanna*'s voyage from Zanzibar to the Far East, Aulick concerned himself primarily with two issues: keeping the ship's coal bunkers well stocked, and showing off the *Susquehanna* to foreign representatives. In Ceylon he had to buy coal at a 25% markup from suppliers who recognized that he had no real choice; at Panay in the East Indies, he had to buy coal from the British East India Company since no local sources could be found.[26]

In addition however, Aulick enjoyed those occasions when he could show off the *Susquehanna* to visitors. He described the circumstances to Navy Secretary Graham:

> "We were...literally crowded every day...with all descriptions of visitors. Such has been the case indeed wherever we have touched. All are received courteously, and properly attended to. Every part of the ship is thrown open to their inspection. She has been the admiration and wonder of every place --not excepting even the English ports. So large and splendid a war steamer they had never before seen. And it is easy to perceive that they leave us with more exalted ideas of our national power and greatness than they before entertained. The effect on our commercial interests alone of displaying this

[26]Commodore Aulick to Mr. Touynam, Ceylon, December 26, 1851, and Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, December 26, 1851, both in Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

noble ship in these remote seas will, in my opinion, be of more value to the nation then the cost of twenty such vessels."[27]

Indeed as the voyage progressed, Aulick's initial displeasure for taking the Susquehanna all the way from Norfolk to Canton faded.

By the time the *Susquehanna* reached Hong Kong on February 5, 1852, Aulick was ready to perform his duties on station, and begin conducting the business of his nation. Along with three other American Navy ships in the region --the sloops *Marion*, *Saratoga*, and *Plymouth*-- and in firm control of his post as Commander-in-Chief of the East India Squadron, Aulick had a healthy crew and a refurbished flagship to augment these forces. In a sign of positive relations between the Naval and State departments, the US Charge d' Affairs in Canton Peter Parker invited Aulick to "make the House of Legation my home on arrival."[28] From Parker, Aulick also received a package of official documents from the President and Secretary of the Navy. These included letters from the State Department for Aulick to proceed to Japan "for the purpose of negotiating a treaty between the U.S. and that government" and a letter from the President dated 30th May authorizing him "to negotiate a treaty between the United States and the Emperor of Japan."[29] Yet against this backdrop of ever-better news and increasing responsibility on his part, Aulick two

---

[27]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, December 26, 1851, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

[28]Commodore Aulick to U.S. Charge d' Affairs Canton Peter Parker, February 10, 1852, Ibid.

[29]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, February 20, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

stunning letters from Secretary of the Navy Graham that would end his tenure as Commodore of the East India Squadron and deny him the opportunity to fulfill his ambitions of opening Japan to American interests.

The first letter was dated November 17, 1851 and arrived in February. In it Graham informed the Commodore that "very grave implications [have been] cast upon your character" by some person who had accompanied Aulick on his trip to Rio de Janeiro. Specifically, the unnamed accuser alleged that Aulick had misled a passenger on board, the Chevalier d. Macedo, top believe that Aulick himself was to pay for his travel and mess expenses onboard the *Susquehanna*, instead of the U.S. Government. Graham also implied that Macedo had not been afforded the appropriate care due a man of his rank while embarked. Although the letter did not name the source directly, it did mention that the complaint had first been received by Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and then forwarded to Graham. Aulick saw at once that the charges against him could have only come from someone on board the *Susquehanna* during the passage from Norfolk to Rio.[30]

Commodore Aulick noted his "great surprise and regret that the department would have thought it proper to act in this matter upon exparte information...as if I were guilty of the conduct imputed to me." He noted that his command had "just succeeded against numerous and almost insurmountable obstacles in bringing the *Susquehanna*, on her experimental trip, to this distant part of the globe" only to find their commanding officer forced to stop all operations and address false accusations against his conduct.[31] Aulick could not understand how the accuser's claim that

---

[30]Secretary Graham to Commodore Aulick, November 17, 1851, Aulick Papers. Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

[31]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, February 17, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

Macedo had been led to believe that the Commodore was paying for his meals in order to curry favor could be thought truthful, and then be used against him in so drastic a fashion. It was particularly frustrating to Aulick's that while the Secretary knew the identity of the accuser, but refrained from relaying that information to Aulick. All his experience and training in the Navy taught Aulick to confront accusers in a straightforward fashion, and it was extremely frustrating and disgusting to him that he was denied this opportunity.

Aulick immediately sought the support of his officers. In a series of letters to the wardroom Aulick asked each of them describe their understanding of the situation, and if they ever understood him to imply that he was footing the Chevalier's mess and lodging bills onboard the *Susquehanna*. All the officers affirmed that they knew that the Chevalier had been a guest of the United States Government and not Aulick's personal guest. The purser noted that he himself had filed the order with Aulick's signature stating that the Chevalier was a guest of the American government, but that he had also overheard Captain Inman addressing a rumor that Macedo was a guest of the Commodore's while in the wardroom sometime during *Susquehanna*'s refit in Rio.[32]

Armed with these statements and his own righteous indignation, Aulick wrote an impassioned eight-page reply to the Secretary's letter. The Commodore told the Secretary that "not only is it untrue, but...I cannot understand how it can have even the shadow of truth for its foundation." Aulick insisted that he did not recall discussing the subject of monetary compensation while underway, and denied that Macedo had ever suffered any discomforts while embarked. Aulick also forwarded the statements of his officers and the purser in which they

---

[32]Lt. John Barry to Commodore J.H. Aulick, February 16, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

acknowledged that everyone on board knew the Chevalier had been a guest of the nation, not the Commodore. They insisted that Macedo never complained of experiencing any discomfort "except those necessarily incident to a sea life, and which are aggravated in the case of every person who suffers from sea sickness." Yet contained within the same envelope was the message that would signal the end of John Henry Aulick's career on the high seas.[33]

The second letter, dated November 18th 1852, informed Aulick he was relieved of his command. Secretary Graham, having discussed the matter with President Fillmore, decided that Aulick must be recalled "in order to satisfy Brazil."[34] This letter –written one day after the first one– directed Aulick to restrict the movement of his flagship to either Hong Kong or Macao, and await his relief. Aulick's successor, the Secretary informed him, was coming "by the most speedy conveyance."[35] After only two weeks on station, Aulick found himself a lame-duck squadron commander chained to a very short leash; relieved on accusations made against him by an anonymous source. The effect on Aulick's pride and honor were devastating. Yet being the senior officer in the region, he could not ignore his obligation to his nation and navy. After several days of stunned contemplation of his options, Aulick determined that his duty as a naval officer was paramount to his own personal or professional concerns. He consequently set out to effect whatever influence he could in East Asia by dispersing the other vessels under his command

---

[33]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, February 17, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[34]Charles Oscar Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1893*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1912), 250.

[35]Secretary Graham to Commodore Aulick, April 23, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol.18, United States Naval Academy.

to various ports in the region. Aulick hoped that this would give him at least reasonable access to information and some ability to influence events.

Foremost, Aulick ordered the *U.S.S. Marion* home to Norfolk. *Marion* had been on station nearly two years and was in such a wretched state of disrepair Aulick felt the sloop more a liability then asset. This decision however, left Aulick with only two ships (the sloops *Saratoga* and *Plymouth*) whose movements he could control, his own flagship being restricted by the Secretary's orders. Fearing reports of "the frequent occurrences of acts of piracy along the whole Chinese coast," Aulick issued orders to Commander Walker to patrol up the East Coast of China and attempt to ascertain the situation at the various ports.[36]

Unknown to Aulick, the increased disruptions along the Chinese coast were and indirect result of the most serious civil war in China of the nineteenth century. The war –known to the west as the Taiping Rebellion– began in earnest in 1850. The Taipings formed loose alliances with pirate consortiums that roamed the Chinese coast, and authorized them to attack western shipping.[37] It was with these pirates that western merchants and navies experienced the most difficulty. Throughout 1852 and early 1853, Aulick dealt with an ever-increasing level of piracy and violence against westerners on the Chinese coastline. United by either religious or financial zeal, the Chinese Taipings and their allies attacked western commercial houses, rioted in several coastal cities, and attacked merchantmen.

Yet with the *Susquehanna* under orders to remain in the vicinity of either Hong Kong or

---

[36]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, 24 February 1852, Ibid.

[37]Philip A. Kuhn. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 113-118.

Macao, Aulick had little real flexibility in the region. The few precious assets he had been able to dispatch were rendered nearly impotent by the seasonal weather changes. Unlike other vessels in the area, *Susquehanna* enjoyed freedom of movement in almost all weather conditions. With the March monsoon setting in, sailing vessels were unable to make any sort of movement against the strong winds. Commander Kelly of the *Plymouth* reported to Aulick that it took his vessel some forty days to make the passage from Batavia to Singapore – a distance of only five hundred miles! Despite his squadron's limitations, Aulick felt it his duty to provide whatever aid he could to American merchantmen and diplomats in distress around the region.[38]

The first real challenge to the Commodore came in mid-April of 1852 when two American merchantmen wrote Aulick an impassioned plea for aid. The captains of the *James Perkins* and *Clarendon* pleaded that they were "in danger of being plundered by the Burmese...they say the British Governor has informed them that he will not give them protection if attacked and they ask me to send...vessels of this squadron."[39] The British and Burmese were about to go to war, and the merchants were threatened with attack if they tried to leave the colonial port of Maulmein. Aulick dispatched the *U.S.S. Sword Fish* to try to reach the British colonial port of Maulmein and relieve the trapped Americans. Although the *Sword Fish* was only supposed to be passing through Asia on her way from San Francisco to Norfolk, Aulick felt he had to order her to help because he could not go himself.

---

[38]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, April 23, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[39]Commodore Aulick to U.S. Consul in Singapore William Shaw, April 18, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

Not all the problems arising in the region were the result of piracy or warfare. In Batavia the Dutch authorities were holding an American vessel and crew on undisclosed charges, and the US Consul in Batavia Edward Cramerus wrote Aulick to demand that he send a warship to indicate American concern. Aulick replied that although his own squadron was busy elsewhere, he would order the *Sword Fish* to stop at Batavia en route to Burma. Although this would leave the merchants stranded in Maulmein harbor for a while, Aulick felt the *Flirt* to be the more pressing matter. However Aulick wrote to both Cramerus in Batavia and Shaw in Singapore that the European authorities were "enlightened and magnanimous" governments and that their officials would no doubt aid the Americans in any way they could. It must have been galling, however, to ask American citizens to depend on Europeans for support when the huge *Susquehanna* sat idle in Hong Kong.[40]

Other pleas for aid continued to arrive in Hong Kong, along with requests from various U.S. Consuls for warships to convey them to various points along the Chinese coast. In many cases, Aulick wanted desperately to comply. His orders from the Navy Department however, severely limited his ability to help. Aulick –the Presidentially appointed Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in East Asia– quickly grew exasperated with the entire situation and he wrote a blistering letter of complaint to Secretary Graham. In it Aulick informed Graham that:

> "more then five months have elapsed since the receipt of your letter directing me to remain with this ship at this place...until the arrival of my successor... who you inform me will arrive by the most speedy conveyance. He has not

[40]U.S. Consul Cramerus to Commodore Aulick, February 25, 1852, Commodore Aulick to U.S. Consul Cramerus, April 19, 1852, and Commodore Aulick to U.S. Consul Shaw, April 19, 1852, all in Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

> yet arrived and according to the news papers...his arrival seems likely to be delayed several months longer. I therefore deem it my duty to say to the Department that the services of this ship are greatly needed over a much wider field of operations...I have lately received applications from several of our citizens at different and distant points on the station, to come or send ships to them for the protection of their persons or property, which they consider in danger of lawless attacks."[41]

Aulick was also distressed that the news of his relief had been published in the local papers, and that in consequence he felt his authority and effectiveness –to say nothing of his dignity– had been severely undermined. With no ships to utilize, no freedom of movement, his reputation tarnished, and distressing news about his wife's health from home; Aulick was now "exceedingly anxious to return home."[42]

Unfortunately for Aulick, his earliest opportunity for relief was still months away. In the interim he had to confront the most serious event of his stay in East Asia: an act of mutiny aboard a U.S. merchant vessel. Peter Parker, the U.S. Charge d' Affairs in Canton, wrote to Aulick to inform him of a nearly successful mutiny aboard the American vessel *Robert Browne*. The vessel had been transporting Chinese Coolies from Amoy, China when the Chinese had tried to overthrow the crew and gain their freedom from forced indentured servitude under the coolie

---

[41]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, April 23, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[42]Commodore Aulick to U.S. Consul Shaw, April 19, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

system. A lifetime mariner, Aulick was naturally horrified and appalled at the news. As a squadron Commodore however, he was even more disturbed to learn of the "fourth act of murder in Chinese waters the last 10 months." Without hesitation, Aulick ordered the sloop *Saratoga* to Amoy in order to address the situation there and bring the perpetrators to justice. Parker's letter informed Aulick that many of the mutineers had escaped the *Robert Browne* and gone hiding amongst the islands off the Chinese coast.[43]

Eventually the demands for aid grew so strident that Aulick felt compelled to exceed his orders. When, on one occasion, some 100 pirates had been captured Aulick decided it was a situation too serious to entrust to a sloop commander. He therefore sailed in the *Susquehanna* –in violation of his orders– to deal with the matter personally.[44] Eventually Aulick and the U.S. Consuls from Amoy and Canton convened a consular court to determine the facts of the case. After much testimony and translation, they determined that only seventeen of the accused had committed murder or piratical acts. Aulick decided that, "justice as well as humanity requires that they be sent back to the place whence they embarked onboard the *Robert Brown*."[45] The seventeen remaining mutineers were turned over to Imperial authority.

Eventually additional aid for the beleaguered squadron began to arrive. The sloop U.S.S. *St. Mary's* from San Francisco arrived with the load of shipwrecked Japanese sailors to be

---

[43]U.S. Charge d' Affairs Parker to Aulick, April 29, 1852, Ibid, and Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, May 3, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[44]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, May 28, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives..

[45]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, June 20, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

returned to Japan. Aulick hoped that this was a sign he would soon receive permission to continue his suspended mission to Japan. His frustration level continued to rise. He still knew "nothing officially of the movements of my successor"[46] as of July. Initially he replied to requests for transportation from American diplomats very respectfully and cordially, even though he had to deny them. Eventually, Aulick became sarcastic in his letters to the diplomats, telling one "this is, to be sure, a quite modest request, asking for only one half of my squadron, for I have but two vessels at present [free to maneuver]."[47] Aulick was also annoyed when he learned in June that the British court in Hong Kong would not hear the case against the coolie mutineers because under British law, "a mutiny by coolies on a foreign ship is not piracy...therefore not justiciable by them."[48] Added to all this was the knowledge that Charles Gibson and the crew of the *Flirt* were still being held in Batavia without official charges, a serious embarrassment to the United States.

Then, in mid-November 1852, Commander Franklin Buchanan reached Hong Kong with orders from the Secretary of the Navy directing Aulick to place Buchanan in command and to consider himself as "detached from command of the United States Squadron in the East India and China Seas." By the same mail, however, Aulick also received another letter dated subsequent to Buchanan's orders. Issued by the new Secretary of the Navy, John Kennedy, it instructed Aulick "not to leave the China Seas until regularly relieved by an order."[49] Aulick therefore placed

---

[46]Commodore Aulick to Acting U.S. Consul Shaw, July 17, 1852, Ibid.

[47]Commodore Aulick U.S Consul Charles Currier, April 19, 1852, Ibid.

[48]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, June 16, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 6, National Archives.

[49]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Kennedy, November 16, 1852, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 7, National Archives.

Buchanan in command of the *Susquehanna* in compliance with the first order, but retained command of the Squadron in compliance with the second. Owing to the delicate situation in the region and the fact that two steamers had just reached Hong Kong and Macao with nearly 1500 tons of coal for the *Susquehanna*, Aulick hoped that his mission to Japan would yet come to pass. Either way, Aulick felt Buchanan to be too junior to handle the deteriorating situation in China.[50]

However, with the second set of orders in hand, Aulick now felt authorized to move more freely about the region. He sailed in the *Susquehanna* up the Chinese coastline in order "to see that our own flag has not been, and is not used, to protect those who have not a just or proper claim to its protection." Alas, while sailing up the coast of China, Aulick engaged in a professional disagreement with Humphrey Marshall, the U.S. Commissioner to China. Upon hearing that Aulick was on the move in the *Susquehanna* from Hong Kong, Marshall wrote and demanded "that you [Aulick] will furnish me, at Macao, immediately, a suitable vessel of war from the naval force under your command on this station to carry me."[51] After all he had endured on station, Aulick was in no mood to deal with impatient and self-important American diplomats. His curt reply to Marshall was that the movement of U.S. warships was under his discretion, and that his ships were not diplomatic ferries. After a series of heated letters to Aulick, Marshall eventually confined himself to complaining bitterly to the Secretary of State that, "I hope that the Secretary of the Navy....will place me in possession of such a general and standing order as will

---

[50]Commodore Aulick to Commodore Shubrick, Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Materials, and Repairs, November 18, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

[51]U.S. Commissioner to China Marshall to Commodore Aulick, January 17, 1853, Correspondence Between the State Department and the Late Commissioner to China, U.S. Department of State, House Document 123, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, 1854.

shield me from the effect of...Naval Commander's hereafter."[52] The requested order never came.

While returning from a month-long excursion to Manila however, both the *Susquehanna* and Commodore Aulick suffered nearly catastrophic problems. For the steamer, it was the failure of a vital air pump in the engineering spaces. Without it, the *Susquehanna* was reduced to a mere sailing vessel. The search for replacement parts revealed that "they cannot be procured this side of England or the United States."[53] Without those parts, Aulick felt the *Susquehanna* to be too dangerous on the high seas during monsoon season, as her masts and rigging could break as they had in the Atlantic storms. But it was the illness that struck Aulick that finally forced him to depart China and return home.

While in Manila, Aulick became very ill. By the time he reached Hong Kong in February, he was in terrible physical shape. He wrote Secretary Kennedy that "the state of my health being very low...I now weigh but one hundred pounds...I am now unable to write and am obliged to dictate to my secretary." Aulick saw no other option but to surrender command of his squadron to his senior officer and leave the tropical station. Aulick was very bitter toward Secretary Graham for " I am not allowed to return in the ship I brought out but after upwards of forty four years in the Navy...I do not merit the harsh treatment which I have received." On March 13th 1853, Commodore Aulick formally gave command of the East India Squadron to Commander John Kelly of the *U.S.S. Saratoga* and departed the next morning on an English steamer for

---

[52]Commissioner Marshall to Secretary Kennedy, February 8, 1853, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from the President and Executive Agencies, 1837-1886, Naval Records Collection of the Officer of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, Reel 9, National Archives, Washington D.C.

[53]Commodore Aulick to Secretary Kennedy, February 7, 1853, Commanding Officer's Letters, Reel 7, National Archives.

London.[54]

The experience of Commodore Aulick in his brief command on the Far China station reveals a great deal about the demands upon Naval commanders on distant stations. Aulick's case is unique because it also shows how the role of diplomacy, the types of naval operations, and the kind of leadership required on distant station were changing in the mid-nineteenth century U.S. Navy. Aulick represented the old style of naval leadership of the type that Commodore Porter had described: older, inflexible in his ideals, gentlemanly, honorable, and possessing a high-degree of self importance. His eventual replacement --Commodore Matthew Perry-- was of the newer breed of naval leadership: smart, well-educated, technically informed, politically savvy, and more open to new ideas.

Whereas Aulick was a man who honestly claimed to be of the opinion that, "my services...belong to the country and whatever disposition the department may see fit," his counterpart took a different attitude.[55] When Perry was offered the command of the East India Squadron he originally declined by stating that he "would accept command....if the sphere of action and size of the squadron were so enlarged as to hold out well-grounded hope of conferring distinction upon its commander."[56] Perry knew that his career in the navy was far from over and

---

[54]Ibid, and Commodore Aulick to Secretary Graham, March 10, 1853, Commanding Officers Letters, Reel 7, National Archives.

[55]Commodore Aulick to Commodore Shubrick, November 18, 1852, Aulick Papers, Box 6, Vol. 18, United States Naval Academy.

[56]John H. Schroeder, "Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Precursor of the Steam Navy," ed. James Bradford, *Captains of the Old Steam Navy.* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 14-15.

that he needed to accept assignments that were challenging and rewarding in order to continue to rise in the ranks. Aulick knew that his career was largely behind him, and his window of opportunity to command vessels at sea was rapidly closing. More importantly it was not in his nature to demand preferred commands or stipulations: Aulick viewed himself as a faithful tool of American policy to be wielded when and where he was needed.

In this sense, the 1850's also marked a turning point for the U.S. Navy: a transition period from mostly sailing ships and sailing captains, to the new rubric of steam propulsion and hard engineering knowledge. From 1843 to 1860 the number of sailing ships remaining in the U.S. Navy decreased from 59 to 44, while the number of steamers increased from 6 to 38. It was therefore no small coincidence that less then two years after Aulick left China, the Navy Secretary convened a board to forcibly retire some 200 officers of advanced years. Aulick was one of those placed on the retired list as a result of this board.[57]

Although he was no stranger to command on distant stations, or to long deployments from home, Aulick proved unable to operate effectively in the role as Squadron Commander for a variety of reasons. Foremost, he was outdone by his own high standards. By relieving Captain Inman and sending him home, Aulick effectively doubled his own workload. He now had to fulfill the role of both ship's captain and squadron commodore. Although this was easy to do en route to Hong Kong, once there it served to merely multiply his problems.

Secondly, Aulick suffered from poor relations with and weak support from his superiors. In the end, Secretary Graham ordered Aulick relieved because of one letter sent by a lone American diplomat aboard the *Susquehanna*. When he returned to the United States in June of

---

[57]Paullin, *Naval Administration,* 219.

1853, Aulick learned that the author of the letter had been Mr. Richard Schenck, an American diplomat traveling with Macedo and also a familiar of Captain Inman. In spite of this, had the Secretary possessed more faith in Aulick as an officer, such an unsubstantiated charge might not have been fatal to his command tenure. Instead Aulick was relieved of command, and then abandoned by the Secretary's office for six months as the official correspondence made its tortuous way back and forth between Hong Kong and Washington.

Ultimately, however, Aulick failed because he could not adapt to the world in which he lived. Duty and honor-bound, Aulick downplayed political considerations when dealing with his fellow Americans. Although he had been successful in Zanzibar when dealing with foreign dignitaries, he was less successful when dealing with the demands placed upon him by other branches of the government or naval bureaus. With them he lacked both the tact and patience required to be an effective commodore on a distant station. Aulick ignored the context of the political environment in which he worked, instead believing himself to be a patriot beyond political reproach. Yet Aulick's actions in relieving Inman and allowing Macedo to gain such an erroneous impression showed an inability or unwillingness to confront the larger political issues of the day facing the U.S. Navy. Aulick's service had just lost two major political battles with the Congress for the reduction of the alcohol ration afloat and the cessation of flogging. When Secretary of the Navy Graham received the letter of complaint against Aulick via the Secretary of State, it was an embarrassing incident that rattled Graham's faith in Aulick as a naval officer who was capable of handling delicate diplomatic assignments. In dealing with Graham, Aulick himself was unwilling to make a firm stand –as Perry had done over command of the East India Squadron– for fear of removal and creating a scandal. In one of the painful ironies of history

however, that is exactly what happened.

Selected Bibliography

Primary Sources

Aulick, John Henry. “Commodore John Henry Aulick Papers, 1810-1874.” United States Naval Academy Special Collection. Record Group 336. Annapolis, Maryland.

Box 2

Volume 2. Personal Journal of J.H. Aulick, Lieutenant, U.S.S. Ontario and U.S.S. Constitution. (December 4, 1820 – May 20, 1824)

Volume 4. Personal Journal of J.H. Aulick, Commander, U.S.S. Vincennes in Pacific Ocean. (October 25, 1834 – August 1, 1834)

Box 5

Volume 16. Personal Journal of J.H. Aulick, Commander of the U.S. Squadron East India and China Seas. (December 9, 1850 – October 15, 1851)

Volume 17. Letter Book of J.H. Aulick, Commander of the U.S. Squadron East India and China Seas. (May 19, 1851 – December 8, 1851)

Box 6

Volume 18. Letter Book of J.H. Aulick, Commander of the U.S. Squadron East India and China Seas. (May 19, 1851 – July 30, 1853)

Volume 19. Order Book of J.H. Aulick, Commander of the U.S. Squadron East India and China Seas. (March 29, 1851 – March 11, 1853)

Volume 20. Journal of the U.S.S. Steam Frigate Susquehanna, W. Inman and F. Buchanan, Commanders. (June 7, 1851 – February 20, 1853)

U.S. Department of State. Correspondence Between the State Department and the Late Commissioner to China, 1852-1854. U.S. Department of State. House Document 123, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, 1854.

U.S. Navy Department. Confidential Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Captains, 1843-1879. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives. Record Group 45. 409 Reels. Washington, D.C.

_____. Letters Recieved by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of the East India Squadron, 1841-1861. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives. Record Group 45. 14 Reels. Washington, D.C.

_____. Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from the President and Executive

Agencies, 1837-1886. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives. Record Group 45. 49 Reels. Washington, D.C.

_____. Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798-1871. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives. Record Group 45. 89 Reels. Washington, D.C.

_____. Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to the President and Executive Agencies, 1821-1886. Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives. Record Group 45. 20 Reels. Washington, D.C.

Secondary Sources

Bailey, Thomas A. *The Art of Diplomacy*. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1968.

Bradford, James C. *Captains of the Old Steam Navy*. Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Henson, Curtis T., Jr. *Commissioners and Commodores: The East India Squadron and American Diplomacy in China*. University, A.L.: University of Alabama Press, 1982.

Johnson, Robert E. *Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asian Waters, 1800-1898*. Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Kuhn, Philip A. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Love, Robert W. *History of the United States Navy, 1775-1941*. Vol. I. Harrisburg, P.A.: Stackpole Books, 1992.

Morrison, Samuel E. *"Old Bruin": Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1794-1858*. Boston: Little & Brown Publishing, 1967.

Paullin, Charles O. *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1912. Reprint, 1967.

_____. *American Voyages to the Orient, 1690-1865*. Annapolis, M.D.: United States Naval Academy Press, 1971. (First published as article series, 1910-1911 in U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*.)

_____. *History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911*. Annapolis, M.D.: United States Naval Academy Press, 1968. (First published as article series, 1904-1914 in U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*.)

Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search for Modern China*. 2nd Ed. New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1999.

Symonds, Craig L. *Confederate Admiral: the Life and Wars of Franklin Buchanan*. Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

_____. *The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 1995.